Similarly to the significant of the concept of permanent establishment (PE) for the purpose of income taxes rules, the relevance of the concept of fixed establishment (FE) for the VAT rules can hardly be overestimated. The term plays a central role, and is consistently relied upon by the legislator, for both determining the place of supply of services in VAT, and to establish the right to VAT refund, where tax is incurred in a country other than that where the business is established. Yet, despite its significance, the term is far from clear, and in recent years the debate over its definition and scope, primarily in the context of new, globalised, economic realities, and the development of the digital economy, has intensified. The aim of this chapter is to shed light over the meaning and significance of the concept of FE for VAT purposes. It will focus first on the meaning and significance of the concept from the perspective of European VAT legislation and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It will then discuss current challenges to the current law posed by new economic realities, discrepant application of the FE criterion at national level, and its links to the PE concept. It is argued that the case law of the CJEU highlights the challenges posed by both globalisation, and digitalisation of the world economy, and that whilst it provides short-term relief to these challenges, dealing with them on a longer term basis will require re-assessment of established jurisprudence. It considers some of the key decisions on FE by national courts, concluding that whilst a unified concept of secondary establishment for the purposes of income tax and VAT is desirable, at present equating PE to FE would likely give rise to double taxation within VAT.
primarily the new digital economy, making cross-border transactions, lacking in any territorial or physical element, become the new normal. The EU response to this new reality has been slow and cumbersome, openly displaying the weaknesses of the EU legislative tax procedure: with all decisions having to be taken by unanimity voting of now 28 Member States, not only it is difficult to see any new legislation approved, but even when approved, new legislation is by nature a compromise, often patchy, and purposively vague.
The factors augmenting the complexity of the place of supply system are also at play when considering the role of FE in the EU VAT system. In the presence of similar external pressures, internal difficulties in approving new VAT legislation, has resulted in the CJEU taking the lead on clarification of the concept and role of FE; yet, as discussed below, consideration of the jurisprudence of the Court in the last decade demonstrates that the Court too, has struggled in adapting a system primarily thought for a national, physical, economy, to a globalised, digital, one.
II. FE in EU VAT law
The concept of FE plays a central role in the EU VAT system; 10 crucial for both determining the place of supply (of services) in VAT, and to establishing the right to VAT refund, where tax is incurred in a country other than that where the business is established. Table 1 provides an overview of all EU VAT rules which rely on the concept of FE. Yet, the use of the concept gives rise to various difficulties, which can be converted into three questions, as follows:
(1) What can be regarded as a FE?
(2) When are services said to be supplied from the FE? (3) When should the FE criterion be used? Article 38 Supplies of gas through a natural gas system, of electricity and of heat or cooling energy through heating and cooling networks (VAT Directive 2006/112/EC) "the place of supply shall be deemed to be the place where that taxable dealer has established his business or has a fixed establishment for which the goods are supplied"
Article 39
Supplies of gas through a natural gas system, of electricity and of heat or cooling energy through heating and "place where the customer has established his business or has a fixed establishment for which the goods are supplied" (a) during the refund period, he has not had in the Member State of refund, the seat of his economic activity, or a fixed establishment from which business transactions were effected" Article 1
Right of refund to taxable persons not established in EU (Thirteenth VAT Directive 86/560/EEC) "A taxable person not established in the territory of the Community…shall mean a taxable person who…has had in that territory neither his business nor a fixed establishment from which business transactions are effected" Whilst a definition of FE now exists within EU VAT legislation, it has been broadly left to the Court to provide guidance on to the above questions. Table 2 provides a comprehensive list of CJEU cases on FE. A glance over the cases' numbers tells its own story, and it is quickly apparent that this jurisprudence can be broadly divided into stages: after the first landmark decision in
OTHER VAT RULES
Berkholz on FE in the context of place of supply rules, 11 there was an approximate 10 years' period where the Court elaborated on the guidance provided in Berkholz; this was followed by a quiet period where no new cases on the topic were referred to the Court, and then, from 2011 onwards, a new stream of cases, focussing primarily on FE in the context of the refund system. unnecessary. 14 Their view had also been confirmed by the results of the public consultation, which it had undertaken prior to presenting the proposal. 15 The matter seemed, on the surface at least, settled; until the new wave of cases started arriving to the CJEU, and it was clear that the development of new economic realities represented a real challenge to the role of the FE concept in the EU VAT system. Answers to the above questions were not as clear as it was once thought.
What can be regarded as a FE?
Remarkably, 16 Welmory concerned a company established in Cyprus which organised sales by auction on an online sales platform. 41 The company concluded a cooperation agreement with a Polish company, under which customers purchased a number of 'bids' from the Cypriot company on an online sales site; those 'bids' then give the customer the right to take part in the sale of the goods offered for auction by the Polish company on that site and to make an offer to purchase one of the items. The Cypriot company later acquired the Polish company, and the question for the Court was essentially whether the Polish company, an independent taxable person, could be regarded as a FE of the Cypriot company, for the purposes of Article 44 of the VAT Directive.
The key element that differentiates this case from previous cases on the concept of FE is that this case concerns the status of the acquirer of services, rather than the supplier of those services. As the Court points out:
"The main proceedings relate to the interpretation of Article 44 of the VAT Directive, which states that the place of supply of services to a taxable person is no longer determined by reference to the taxable person supplying the services but by reference to the taxable person receiving them. 
When are services supplied from the FE?
The recurrent usage by the legislator of the expression "fixed establishment from which services are supplied" or "fixed establishment from which business transactions are effected", indicates that the application of the FE criterion is dependent, not solely from the existence of a FE, but crucially also on the ability to establish a connection between the FE and the services supplied.
In essence, the problem has been to determine which activities the FE has to perform in order for the services to be considered to have been supplied from there.
In DFDS, the Court concluded the services had been supplied by the FE. Whilst Court did not elaborate on the reasons, and namely what activities would have to be performed by the FE in order to conclude that the services had been supplied from therein, Advocate General La Pergola discussed briefly the issue. In his Opinion, he concluded that the services had been supplied by the FE because the contracts were signed in the United Kingdom, payments were made in British currency, and the FE would deal with eventual complaints. In its judgment, the Court does not make reference to any of these points, but it does refer to the need to take into account "the actual place where the tours are marketed". 44 The place where the contracts were signed was also used in ARO Lease as an important element which pointed to the fact that the services had been supplied from ARO in the Netherlands, as opposed as from a FE in Belgium; and the VAT Committee (almost unanimously) considered "For the purposes of exclusion of a right to refund, taxable transactions must actually be carried out by the fixed establishment in the State where the application for refund is made and a mere ability to carry out such transactions does not suffice.
In the main proceedings, it is not in dispute that the undertakings concerned do not carry out output taxable transactions in the Member State where the applications for refund have been made through their technical testing and research departments.
In those circumstances, a right to refund of the input VAT paid must be granted, without it being necessary to examine, moreover, whether the undertakings in question do actually each have a 'fixed establishment' within the meaning of the provisions to be interpreted…" 58
Whilst this decision cannot be said to be surprising in light of the wording of the provisions, as well as of previous jurisprudence, its consequences are far reaching. 59 Table 4 below summarises the above CJEU case-law. 
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When should the FE criterion be used?
Answering this question involves two different issues, namely: first, to what extent should the general place of supply rules, which make use of the FE connector, be used, in detriment of other specific place of supply rules; second, even where the general place of supply rule applies, which should prevail, the place of business or the place of FE.
Insofar as the first point is concerned, the application of one single place of supply rule to all services was regarded from the outset as problematic by the European Commission, 60 and as a result, the VAT Directive includes several specific place of supply rules, applied to certain services, such as consultancy, entertainment, advertising, etc. The nature of the interaction between these specific rules, and the general place of supply rules was not explicitly stated by the legislator, however, so questions over that nature soon arose: should the specific rules be regarded as exemptions to the general place of supply rules, and as such, interpreted strictly?
The Court referred for the first time to the relationship between these different rules in Berkholz, when it stated that that the specific rules "set out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied", whilst what is now Article 44 laid down the general rule on the matter. 61 However, it was not until Trans Tirreno that the Court gave more specific guidance as to interconnection between the different rules. 62 The Court stated in that case that: "[Article 43] by way of derogation from the strict principle of territoriality, lays down the general rule that the service is deemed to be supplied at the place where the supplier has established his business or has a fixed establishment from which the service is supplied.
[Other Articles provide] for certain derogations from that general rule for specific services where the fiction that the services are supplied at the supplier's place of business is inappropriate and it lays down other criteria defining the place at which those services are deemed to be supplied." 63 The characterisation by the CJEU of specific place of supply rules as derogations did not, however, completely clarify matters: the questions of whether the general place of supply rule 60 As highlighted in the explanatory memorandum to the Sixth Directive proposal, see took interpretative precedent over specific place of supply rules, or whether those rules were to be interpreted restrictively, remained unanswered. Some years later, the Court delivered its decision in Hamann, 64 where it started by reiterating the position already expressed in Trans Tirreno, but then seemed to conclude that specific place of supply rules constitute exceptions to the main rule, and as such should be interpreted strictly. This reading was not without controversy, and Advocate General Fennelly later defended that the decision in Hamann provided "no intimation of the priority, as a matter of interpretative principle, of the first paragraph over the second." 65 The issue was not, nevertheless, settled until the decision in Dudda. 66 The question referred to the CJEU in Dudda was whether sound-engineering services should be regarded as "cultural, artistic, entertainment, or similar services" within the meaning of what is now Article 53, or whether they should be deemed to fall within the scope of the general rule. At the hearing, the German government referred to the legislative history of the place of supply rules, as well as to the rulings in Trans Tirreno and Berkholz, to defend specific place of supply rules constituted derogations to the general rule, and as such should be interpreted strictly. The European Commission took the opposite view, arguing that specific place of supply rules should be seen as providing lex specialis in respect of the various specialised services to which they apply, with the general place of supply rule providing for a residual lex generalis; a deliberate policy of reading the specific place of supply rules in a restrictive fashion would be a mistake.
The Court, following the opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, agreed with the Commission, stating that the general place of supply rules in no way took precedent over specific place of supply rules; and in every situation, the question which arose was whether it was covered by one of the specific rules, and if not, it fell within the scope of the general rule. 67 This approach has been confirmed by the Court in latter cases. 68 The second point highlighted above stems from the fact that place of supply rules which make reference the FE criterion tend to use similar wording: "the place of supply shall be deemed to be the place where that taxable person has established his business or has a fixed establishment for which the goods / services are supplied". This wording reflects the use of two different criteria for determining the place of supply: the place where the supplier has established his business, and the place where the supplier has a fixed establishment. The use in the provisions of the word "or" could lead to the assumption that they constitute alternative criteria of equal 64 value, i.e., that none has primacy over the other. This interpretation was, however, rejected by the CJEU in its early case-law.
In Berkholz, the Court adopted the view that the place where the supplier has established his business is the "primary point of reference" for determining the place of supply of services.
Another establishment can only be referred to "if the reference to the place where the supplier has established his business does not lead to a rational result for tax purposes or creates a conflict with another Member State". 69 It resulted from this decision therefore that the FE criterion should only be applied where: there was a FE from which supplies were made; and the use of the place where the business is established did not lead to a rational result for tax purposes or created a conflict with another Member State. 70 This de facto hierarchy established by the Court in Berkholz amongst place of supply criteria was consistently reiterated by the Court in subsequent cases involving FE claims, 71 where the Court had the opportunity to elaborate on the meaning of irrational result. In DFDS, the conditions for being regarded as a FE were fulfilled, so the CJEU had to decide on whether the use of the place where the supplier has established its business criterion would lead to an irrational result for tax purposes, or create a conflict with another Member State. 72 The Court, following the Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola, concluded that the use of this criterion would lead to distortions of competition, and thus, to an irrational result for tax purposes:
"Systematic reliance on the place where the supplier has established his business could in fact lead to distortions of competition, in that it might encourage undertakings trading in one Member State to establish their business, in order to avoid taxation, in another Member State which has availed itself of the possibility of maintaining the VAT exemption for the services in question." 73 In ARO Lease, the issue of the rationality of using the place where the supplier has established his business criterion was again raised by Advocate General Fennelly. The Court concluded, however, since a FE was deemed not to exist, it was not necessary to consider the rationality element. 74 Some years later, in RAL, the CJEU returned to this element in a slightly different 69 Case 168/84, [1985] ECR 2251, at paragraph 17. 70 I. Roxan refers to a "double-test for the use of a fixed establishment the place of supply", in n. 13, at 611. 71 [1998 ] STC 357 where it was observed that: "the cynic might observe, however, that in every case where the court has emphasised the priority of the main place of business test, the court has also found that no fixed establishment existed. It remains to be seen what the court would decide to be the appropriate test where they find that there was a fixed establishment from which the supply was provided". context: the "rational result for tax purposes" was extended from a criterion to choose between place of business or place of FE, to a criterion to choose between general and specific place of supply rules. 75 Following the above decisions, it was suggested that the lack of consideration by the CJEU of the circumstances, under which the use of the place where the supplier has established its business criterion would lead to a conflict with another Member State, was the main source of uncertainty. 76 Yet, time has dispelled these concerns; instead the main aspect of the last decade's case-law on this regard, has been the implicit taking over of rationality considerations, to the detriment of the place of business as the "primary reference". Indeed, applying rationality has meant that, in practice, the place of business can no longer be regarded as the primary point of reference; 77 where there is a FE, from which supplies are made, this will be the connecting factor used, by tax authorities, and courts alike. Place of business has de facto become lex generalis; FE from which supplies are made is lex specialis. Hamann (51/88) -specific place of supply rules constitute exceptions to the main rule, and as such should be interpreted strictly Dudda (C-327/94) -specific place of supply rules are lex specialis, and the general rule, lex generalis; -general rule is a residual rule, which will only apply when specific rules do not RAL (C-453/03) -place of supply rule chosen should lead to a rational solution from the point of view of taxation
Place of business or place of FE?
Berkholz (168/84) -place of business is the primary point of reference, another establishment can only be referred to if place of business does not lead to a rational result for tax purposes or creates a conflict with another Member State
DFDS (C-260/95)
-systematic creation of distortions to competition constitutes an irrational result for tax purposes European law on the application of the FE criterion, as outline above, gives rise to various difficulties. These can be broadly divided into three headings, as follows:
III. FE in EU VAT Law: Challenges
(1) Adapting to new economic realities (2) FE in domestic law (3) FE vs. PE Each of these issues is addressed below.
Adapting to new economic realities
The pressures facing the EU VAT system are neither new, nor circumspect to specific areas of system. Over the last two decades a system that was thought primarily for a national, physical, economy, has had to adapt to a globalised, digital, one. Difficulties have therefore arisen in a multitude of areas, from exemptions to compliance obligations, and place of supply rules are no exception. The above analysis of recent CJEU cases highlights the significant challenges arising in the context of the FE criterion:
-Welmory highlights the challenges presented to the FE concept, as it had been developed by the Court, by the digitalisation of the world economy; and,
-Daimler demonstrates the difficulties for the role of the FE criterion within place of supply and refund rules, arising from a globalised world economy.
As recently stated by the OECD, the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself. 78 The difficulty resides in the fact that legislation, as well as early CJEU case-law on the concept of FE, has been constructed on the presumption of a physicality, which has been eroded by the progressive digitalisation of the world economy. The problem is not exclusive to VAT, and the same presumption of physically has traditionally been a constitutive element of the concept of PE, which requires a territorial or geographical link to the ground. This element of the PE concept has been consistently challenged in recent years, 79 not only because it creates a distortion to competition by treating e-commerce and traditional commerce differently, 80 accepting a digital presence as a virtual PE, 82 despite strong criticism and the apparent willingness of some countries to move in that direction. 83 In VAT, the challenges posed by the digital economy to place of supply rules, and in particular to the FE concept, have been known for some time. As far back as the late 1990s, scholars argued that if the CJEU did not drop the human resources element from the FE concept, the tax system would "slowly commit suicide". 84 Apart from the enforcement element, there is also a significant risk of manipulation: on one hand, the easiness in which digital items can be transferred between different companies within a group, creates a strong incentive to route the acquisition of these intangibles through FEs located in low tax jurisdictions; 85 and on the other hand, avoiding the existence of an FE is also relatively easy in the digital era, namely by removing the presence human and technical resources, or placing them in another country.
In this context, the preliminary reference to the CJEU in Welmory was unsurprising, and the decision eagerly waited. 86 The key question was whether the Court would depart from previous case-law, and endorse the possibility of a virtual FE. Either a positive or a negative answer would have had significant ramifications for the FE criterion; the Court's decision was somewhere in between. There is a clear departure from previous case-law, namely the requirement which goes back to the decision in Bekholz of the presence of human and technical resources -the Court now accepts that the existence of an FE is not dependent on the existence of those resources. However, it did stop short of removing the physicality nexus in the concept of FE, by stating that "an appropriate structure, such as computer equipment, servers and software" was still necessary. The decision represented a step forward towards acknowledgement of new economic realities, but does raise some, possibly contradictory, concerns: on one hand, the lack of support for a virtual FE means that some of the manipulation risks mentioned above, are still present; on the other hand, in some situations, as it is further demonstrated in the Daimler case, establishing the existence of an FE will put into question fundamental principles of the EU VAT system.
Daimler highlights the challenges to the FE criterion arising from new corporate structures which reflect globalisation: the various activities, which form part of a production chain, are no longer circumscribed to one country, or even a few countries, but are not carried out in many different countries. As the OECD comments "world trade and production are increasingly structured around global value chains". 87 This geographical fragmentation of production processes according to the comparative advantages of each location, has increased efficiency and competitiveness, but also poses significant challenges. 88 One of these challenges is allocation of taxing rights, both for CIT, and for VAT purposes: in CIT this reality has created the problem known as profit splitting; in VAT, however, where no splitting is possible, 89 the difficult has been to identify which country in abstract has the strongest claim to taxing a specific transaction. The problem is (unwillingly) further aggravated by the Court's case-law on other areas of the VAT system, as Daimler demonstrates.
In this context, and like Welmory, the preliminary reference to the CJEU in Daimler came as no surprise. 90 Predictably also the Court reiterated the need for taxable supplies to be carried out by the FE in order to the criterion to be used, thus confirming the cumulative nature of the FE nexus: the establishment has to fulfil the conditions for an FE, and carry out taxable supplies.
The decision was the right one, both in light of the wording of the place of supply and refund provisions, and of the principles of the EU VAT system; on the contrary, a decision in favour of the Swedish tax authorities would have had the potential to significantly compromise the principle of the right to deduct.
Under existing rules the right to deduct for a company operating in Member States, other than the one where it is headquartered, can be exercised via one of two routes: where there is a FE, the right to deduct can be exercised through a VAT return; where no FE is present, the right to deduct can be exercised via the refund system. In the case of Daimler, however, the position and applies even to preparatory activities where output transactions were never ultimately carried out. 93 The question, therefore, cannot be whether the right to deduct can be denied in respect of activities which will ultimately lead to taxable outputs; but rather how can it be exercised. By deciding in favour of the taxpayer, the Court ensured that the right to deduct could be exercised via the refund procedure. short, apparently unremarkable case, 95 which had nevertheless massive consequences for the overall functioning of the EU VAT system. 96 The decision to exclude businesses that did not perform taxable output activities from the scope of VAT was neither inevitable in light of the wording of the Directive, nor is it the international norm. In the so-called modern VATs the test for right to deduct input VAT is whether that tax is related to carrying out the person's enterprise, rather than whether they are directly used to make taxable supplies; an entity with employees, making acquisitions for business purposes, would therefore be treated as a taxable person, regardless of whether it does taxable supplies. 97 Returning to Daimler, the position adopted by the Court of ensuring the exercise of the right to deduct via the refund system, does provide short-term relief, but it can only be seen as a temporary solution. Ultimately, the reality of geographical fragmentation of production, as well as the evolving nature of secondary establishments demonstrated in Welmory, will need to be addressed. Like other areas of the VAT system, such as the treatment of holdings, or that of financial instruments, the functioning of place of supply rules is being hampered by the Court's reluctance to depart from its own judicial construct of economic activity.
FE in domestic law
At present, national practices as regards the FE criterion differ significantly; 98 113 -where services are supplied by more than one establishment, the following questions are relevant to determine establishment from which services are supplied:
•which establishment has authority to make contracts?
•which establishment has authority to take decisions concerning the contracted services?
•which establishment prepares or makes other decisions, for example about the artwork or other creative work used in the campaign?
•which establishment actually uses the services?
Binder Hamlyn, 114 and Vincent Consultants 115 -FE for the purposes of receiving services may still exists, even if no business activities are carried out there, but are carried out from other addresses overseas
FE vs. PE
The discussion over whether FE and PE are -or should be -identical concepts, and whether there should be one single concept of secondary establishment for VAT and corporate income tax (CIT), has been going on for some time. Although the concept of PE had been discussed by the Court in the context of DFDS, in FCE Bank the CJEU quickly dismissed its relevance, noting that the OECD Model Convention, and consequently its Commentary, is irrelevant "since it concerns direct taxation whereas VAT is an indirect tax". 116 The statement, however, did not settle what, in practice, is a particularly relevant question. The difficulty lays in the fact that some legal factors militate in favour of their similarity, others militate against it.
There is clearly much commonality between the two concepts. 117 Militating against their similarly however is, first, the terminological discrepancy: the fact that the legislator has consistently, and over a significant time period, used different terms, is indicative of intent to convey different meanings. 118 Yet, this is terminological discrepancy, so evident and consistent in the English language, is not present in every language. As demonstrated by Table 7 below, within the EU alone, in approximately 1/3 of official languages, the same term is used to identify a secondary establishment for VAT, as for a secondary establishment for corporate income tax purposes. 119 It is also said -and that appears to be the ratio behind the Court's statement in FCE Bank -that VAT and CIT are different taxes, and as a result the legislative function of the secondary establishment criterion in each of these taxes is also distinct: its function within VAT is to identify where consumption takes place, whilst for CIT purposes is to identify where income is generated. 121 The argument, however, is misleading. Whilst it is certainly true that the object of taxation for these two taxes, i.e. what is being taxed, is dissimilar, the core function of the secondary establishment criterion is not: in both taxes its function remains in essence to allocate the right to tax to a given country. 122 As opposed to what is often argued therefore, similarity of function is actually one of the most convincing arguments in support of a unified concept of secondary establishment.
Notwithstanding the above, comparing the PE concept in the OECD Model Convention, with that of FE under CJEU case-law, it is clear that despite the trend towards their expansion, 123 as they stand, there are still key differences between the two concepts. 124 The two most significant differences are the possibility envisaged by the OECD Model Convention of an agent PE, whilst a similar agency structure would not be sufficient to indicate the presence of an FE; 125 and the need for the establishment to carry out taxable transactions for the FE criterion to be applied, whilst no such requirement is present insofar as a PE is concerned. Both differences point towards a clear conclusion, namely that the concept of PE is broader than that of FE, so that an FE will necessarily fulfil the conditions for its characterisation as a PE, but the opposite may not be the case.
The above differences are acknowledged even in countries which apply the same term to characterise secondary establishments for CIT and for VAT purposes. In practice, and with a few exceptions, 126 most tax authorities take the terms to have different meanings depending on the type of tax in question. 127 In line with the above conclusion on the broader nature of the PE concept, tax authorities will often assume the presence of a PE, where the presence of an FE is established, but will not necessarily assume the presence of an FE, where a PE exists. 128 Having established that the two concepts are at present dissimilar, the question is then whether ideally they should be. There is much to support in a unified concept secondary establishment for VAT and CIT: not only would it promote conceptual coherence given the similarity of their function; but there is also an obvious practicality element to it, which would result in decreased compliance and administrative costs, as well as in increased legal certainty. Historical, as well as practical, reasons would dictate that the alignment of concepts would see the PE concept, as outlined in the OECD Model Convention, taking centre stage: PE is a much older concept, dating back to the 19 th century German law, 129 as well as a more widely known and accepted concept worldwide. 130 Yet, if the FE concept was to be align to that of PE double taxation problems would be likely to arise, either at output level -same transaction deemed taxable in two different countries -or at input level -denial of deductibility of input tax. This double taxation is partially a result of the complexity of place of supply rules, in the case of outputs; and a result of the concept of taxable person, and in particular of economic activity, as it has been interpreted by the Court. 131 Therefore, whilst a unified concept of secondary establishment is clearly desirable, alignment of the concepts of PE and FE must be preceded by a review of place of supply rules, as well as reconsideration of settled case-law on the concept of economic activity, so as to ensure that situations of double taxation would not occur.
IV. Conclusion
126 See above comments on position of Italian tax authorities and courts. 127 See for example M. Gorazda and D. Elvira Benito, n. 103 above, as regards Spanish law and practice. 128 There are, however, some exceptions: recently the Italian tax authorities issued guidance to the effect that participants in Expo 2015 carrying out activities therein were required to fulfil their tax obligations for both income tax and VAT purposes, see G. 
